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Book review
Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance, J.C. Coffee Jr. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK
(2006). vii plus 389pp., £18.99, ISBN: 0-19-928809-7, 978-0-19-928809-0
In Gatekeepers, a commanding book of policy scholarship for an academic and professional audience,
Columbia University’s John Coffee diagnoses corporate scandals, assesses reforms and prescribes further
corrections. The book scrutinizes auditors most extensively, and also thoroughly examines underwriters,
attorneys, analysts and rating ﬁrms. These professions are vital in corporate governance, for ‘‘all boards of
directors are prisoners of their gatekeepers,’’ Coffee says, and no board ‘‘can outperform its professional
advisors.’’
Gatekeeper effectiveness is inﬂuenced by the role that reputation plays in valuing professional services.
Many suggest that auditors place a premium on honesty to win favor from external audiences, especially
investors. Although essential, Coffee also explores how auditors must develop reputations, projected toward
managers, for exercising professional skepticism when evaluating ﬁnancial statement assertions. That trait is
compromised when auditors cross-sell consulting services to clients or otherwise become beholden to
management.
After cross-selling consulting services became an important revenue stream for audit ﬁrms during the 1990s,
ﬁrms decided that each partner ‘‘should be compensated as much as a salesman as an auditor.’’ This practice
changed audit ﬁrm culture, undermining ‘‘the core values of the professional ﬁrm’’ in favor of ‘‘primarily
commercial interests.’’ To correct resulting auditing laxity and restore its traditional professional culture, US
law now limits auditor cross-selling of consulting work to audit clients. These restrictions reinvigorate
auditing’s historical watchdog function.
Until recently, managers supervised auditors and auditors may have responded to their preferences,
reducing audit quality. US reforms changed the relationship by vesting board audit committees with power
over auditors. Other reforms may be better in theory, such as random assignment of auditors to particular
engagements or using ﬁnancial statement insurance, but these face practical hurdles. Coffee notes that an ideal
governance structure is not easily identiﬁed and audit committee supervision of auditors may be the best
available.
Auditor incentives to invest in reputation may remain low, however, for only a handful of ﬁrms are capable
of auditing the vast majority of the world’s largest companies. With limited competition, it may not pay for
ﬁrms to develop reputations for exercising professional skepticism or providing rigorous audits. There appears
to be no solution to this problem of concentration, short of the radical and unlikely prospect of breaking the
ﬁrms up into a larger number of smaller units.
As a result of these limitations on incentives, legal liability threats are necessary to promote gatekeeper
effectiveness, Coffee explains. But they pose a Catch-22. Without a credible liability threat, gatekeepers are
tempted to acquiesce in managerial preferences; with it, they demand detailed rules and insist upon narrow
duties. Coffee argues that regulatory reform must address this conundrum.
Excessive litigation risk is one explanation for the greater detail in US GAAP compared with other
accounting systems, including IFRS. This is because ‘‘rules give the accountant a safe harbor, whereas
discretion invites lawsuits.’’ Coffee does not opine on whether rules or principles are superior in accounting,
except to note that the choice affects the scope of discretion. He refocuses debate by asking the more
fundamental question: to whom is discretion given? Whatever form standards take, current accounting
practice gives discretion in choosing conventions to managers. Coffee would vest discretion in auditors.
doi:10.1016/j.bar.2008.01.003
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Yet this prescription faces a related obstacle: litigation fears also explain why auditors resist responsibility
for assessing the appropriateness of chosen accounting conventions, insisting that management has this
responsibility. Auditor duties are limited to testing year-to-year consistency without opining on the selection
of applicable conventions. Coffee notes that the ‘‘true and fair view’’ principle has long been law, but that the
profession diminishes its signiﬁcance by emphasizing compliance with US GAAP instead. ‘‘True regulatory
reform must re-introduce an obligation’’ of reasonableness on auditors, Coffee contends.
Reformers urge auditors to recognize a responsibility to detect material fraud, but the profession fears
exposure to increased litigation by doing so. The profession emphasizes the role of internal controls in
disrupting fraud and agrees to conduct tests and give opinions on control effectiveness. This auditor reticence
appears in securities underwriting, where auditors avoid replying to underwriters’ inquiries about fraud
when preparing offerings. The standoff between underwriters and accountants is ‘‘disappointing,’’ Coffee
says, lamenting that the auditing profession is ‘‘refusing to discuss the prospect for fraud ywith other
gatekeepers.’’
Increasing auditor discretion and leverage with their clients are the primary policy prescriptions that
Coffee offers to promote auditor effectiveness. He acknowledges that the profession will resist expanding
its obligations, whether to assess reasonableness or search for fraud. Overcoming the resistance requires
‘‘internalizing norms’’ of oversight that may be hard to generate absent requisite incentives. Coffee notes that
concern for reputation and fear of litigation, both ampliﬁed by recent scandals and reforms, may help.
Moreover, cultural change may be under way.
Still, auditors probably lack sufﬁcient incentives related to enhanced reputation to perform optimally. And
litigation’s deterrence may not induce ideal performance. It is prudent to instill the necessary professional
values into the younger generation of accountants now being trained in universities. However, incentives
ultimately hinge on the profession’s internal culture and, due to the cross-selling of recent generations, it may
take many years for the required cultural change to crystallize.
Perhaps participants can draw on lessons from the cross-selling experience to supply incentives. By
rewarding auditors with lucrative consulting work, managers impaired auditors’ willingness to second guess
managerial judgments. Coffee says: ‘‘the carrot works better than the stick, precisely because the threat to take
the carrot away was more credible.’’ Following this logic, auditors may need to be paid bonuses for fraud
detection and reasonableness opinions. The challenge, then, is to ﬁnd money to subsidize these incentives.
Underwriters and other gatekeepers could chip in by paying their proportionate share for these services.
The book mostly analyzes US practice, but includes an illuminating comparative chapter. This highlights
Europe, where countries have less litigation than the US and use accounting systems that tend to rely relatively
more on principles than rules. Coffee explains that the types of accounting frauds observed in different
countries are related to the concentration of corporate ownership. In locales characterized by concentrated
ownership, incentives motivate fraud artists to manipulate the balance sheet and funnel assets to controlling
persons. In those with dispersed ownership, incentives push them to manipulate the income statement and
award earnings-based compensation to insiders, especially by using stock options.
Such insights may help to explain the varying form of accounting standards in different cultures today. They
also point up the more daunting challenges of designing reliable corporate governance systems amid
globalization. That appears to be a book for another day, however. The immediate priority is to ﬁx enduring
problems in the US gatekeeper regime. This book addresses that need with clarity, scholarly thoroughness and
policy astuteness.
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